Abstract. The first official document concerning technical risk assessment in railway transport was "Safety
Introduction
At the beginning of the 90's first efforts were taken to unify European railway market. In 1991 The Council of the European Communities issued "COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community's railways (91/440/EEC)", which main objective was liberalization of European rail carriage market. Following decisions were taken upon two paths, running close to each other and including:
-interoperability -safety The significance of interoperability of railway vehicles comes from variety of technological solutions around community. Interoperability of technical means of transport allows elimination of technological barriers between member countries. Regarding interoperability actions, at the begging, were divided between high speed railway and conventional railway. Eventually "DIRECTIVE 2008/57/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 June 2008 on the interoperability of the rail system within the Community" covered both theses aspects and updated them accordingly with the evolution of European since development in XXI century. Safety requirements for railway were written down in DIRECTIVE 2004/49/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community's railways. On the basis of this document all railway undertaking and infrastructure managers had to build their Safety Management Systems (SMS). The most important part of this system is risk assessment. SMS was to be approved by NSA (National Safety Authority -Urząd Transportu Kolejowego -in Poland), in case of railway undertaking (RU) by a safety certificate, and in case of infrastructure manager (IM) safety authorization. Member countries were also obliged to establish independent investigation bodies -NIB (National Investigation Bodies -Państwowa Komisja Badania Wypadków Kolejowych -in Poland).Safety Directive also points out the way to achieve CST (common safety targets) minimum safety levels for each countries, and market operators. All these actions are supposed to outline safety requirements, which all operators on liberalized market should comply with. It will limit the number of railway subjects functioning on the market, but will force them to be prepared for work. Railway operators will fulfill certain amount of requirements concluding under conceptions of interoperability and safety. Figure 1 shows predictions about the number of railway operators (not only RU and IM) throughout implementation of European directives. on the adoption of a common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment Commission regulation 352/2009/EC defines first CSM (common safety methods) on risk evaluation and assessment methods, and Directive 2008/110/EC expands the scope of subjects whom safety management systems concern -these are "entities in charge of maintenance". Concurrently increases requirements for safety managements in their railway vehicle maintenance procedures. Accordingly its necessary to focus on technical risk assessment in current risk assessment modules.
Technical risk assessment system -requirements

European requirements
Directive 2008/110/EC speaks about the need to build safety management systems for entities who are responsible for maintenance. There is a wide scope of railway operators who can be responsible for maintenance , from owners of railway vehicles, users to specialized maintenance workshops (in polish realms they are called ZNTK -Zakłady Naprawcze Taboru 
Craft requirements
As it was mentioned before main requirements for railway conduct from IRIS. After many years railway industry worked out a standard of production and evaluation which is specific for this craft. It manages whole process of planning and production of railway vehicles and consisting • calculation and documentation,
• data collection, analysis and improvement action plan • set up,
• implementation of defined tasks of the action plan. Also it is crucial to manage the life cycle cost (LCC) regarding the reliability of the product (R), accessibility (A), maintainability (M), and safety (S). Accordingly to the PN-EN 50126 standard during RAMS analysis you need to cover all the aspects and phases of life cycle enlisted below ( fig. 3 i 4) :
A. concept B. definition of product C. risk analysis D. product requirements E. division of requirements concerning the product F. project and implementation (including staff training) G. production H. installation (assembly) I. validation J. acceptance of product K. operation of product (incl. service and supplies) L. disposal.
Main factors that influence RAMS concerning railway are:
• system condition -source of failure (breakdowns) coming from the interior of the system throughout whole lifecycle, • operation condition -source of failure (breakdowns) coming from the operation of the system throughout whole lifecycle, • maintenance condition (service) -source of failure (breakdowns)
coming from the maintenance of the system throughout whole lifecycle.
These factors interact with each other, for example: reliability of product is linked with the interior sources of failures, which influences maintenance actions. So if you want to obtain a reliable system you need to identify all aspects concerning RAMS, a diagram shown on figure 4 represents division of factors influencing RAMS.
Reliability
Goals for reliability are defined throughout failure categories, and are shown in table 1 
Plan of correcting actions
Plan o preventive actions
Long and short period action plans
RAMS form
Client requirements
Company's vision and mission A failure that prevents train movement or causes a delay to service greater than a specified time and/or generates a cost greater than a specified level.
Filled out RAMS form
RAMS -throughout lifecycle
System
Definition &
Concept
Risk Analysis
Major (Service
Failure)
A failure that must be rectified for the system to achieve its specified performance and does not cause a delay or cost greater than the minimum threshold specified for a significant failure.
Minor
A failure that does not prevent a system achieving its specified performance and does not meet criteria for Significant or Major failures.
Reliability parameters:
MTTF -mean time to failure; MDTFP -mean distance to failure; MTBF -mean time between failure; MDBF -mean distance between failure. (*) Define the technical and operational conditions in the application with respect to total failure, emergency operation 1, emergency operation 2, failures with no effect on operation.
